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  1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Joining the euro-area is an important challenge for new EU member sates. Upon accession, these
countries will participate in the third stage of EMU as Member States with a derogation from
the adoption of the euro.1 Since ERMII is not open to non-members, these countries will need
at least two years after accession in order to satisfy all convergence criteria.2 The obligation to
participate in ERMII before joining the euro-area allows for several exchange rate strategies3 :
Countries with ﬂexible exchange rates such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia
will gradually tighten their exchange rate regime by ﬁrst participating in ERMII and then in the
euro-area, following a path similar to the one followed by the current euro-area Member States.
On the other hand, countries with ﬁxed exchange rate arrangements such as Bulgaria, Estonia
and Lithuania will have to move to a more ﬂexible exchange rate arrangement like the target-zone
regime of ERMII before irrevocably ﬁxing their exchange rate to the euro. This path entails
elements of instability since the temporary relaxation of the exchange rate regime may leave the
economies more vulnerable to speculative attacks and capital inﬂows related to the convergence
play. One possibility for these countries wouldb et or e t a i nt h e i rC u r r e n c yB o a r dA r r a n g e m e n t
(CBA) while participating in ERMII.4
Existing literature in this area emphasizes several advantages of retaining a CBA during ERMII
participation such as discouraging speculative attacks (Sinn, 1999), preserving the credibility of
monetary policy and avoiding the cost of introducing new instruments (Begg et al., 2001). Without
1 It is a common understanding that an opt-out clause such as the one granted for the UK and Denmark will
not be granted to the candidate countries. This implies that joining the euro-area is not an option for the new EU
countries but a ﬁnal target. Once nominal convergence is achieved, these countries will become members of the
euro-area.
2 The six convergence criteria concern the level of the budget deﬁcit/GDP ratio, the debt/GDP ratio, the
long-term interest rate, the inﬂation rate as well as exchange rate stability and the independence of the Central
Bank.
3 Buiter and Grafe (2001), however, argue that accession countries can avoid the two-year ERM membership
period before euro-area participation without violating the Maastricht Treaty.
4 This scenario is not ruled out by the Council, the Commission and the ECB but no formal decision can be
made before the speciﬁc country applies for ERMII participation. According to the current EU position, a CBA
c o u l db ec o m p a t i b l ew i t hE R M I Io n l yo nac a s eb yc a s eb a s i sw h i l et h eE C Bs h o u l da g r e ea b o u tt h ec e n t r a lr a t e
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beneﬁt from abandoning the CBA at the beginning of ERMII participation. It is well-known
that entry into the euro-area requires proper policy adjustment and economic reforms in the
accession countries so that sustainable nominal convergence has been achieved. Thus, abandoning
an existing CBA can signal to markets the sustainability of nominal convergence and, hence,
improve the prospects of joining the euro-area by reducing market uncertainty. The beneﬁto f
this positive signal is important since the country’s success will crucially depend on markets’
expectations about future economic performance. For example, markets’ expectation of a failure
to join the euro-area will reverse the process of interest rate convergence and make the satisfaction
of the convergence criteria more diﬃcult.5
We will show in the framework of a simple signaling model that abandoning an existing CBA
within ERM can signal to markets the country’s improved macroeconomic fundamentals. It is
assumed that the accession country’s output depends positively on all economic reforms that
allowed the fulﬁllment of the convergence criteria. However, markets do not know with certainty
the magnitude of this economic adjustment shock. In other words, markets do not know whether
the country is ‘competent0 enough to be accepted to the euro-area. One can show that the cost of
abandoning the commitment environment (CBA) for a more discretionary environment (ERMII)
will be lower for the country that has signiﬁcantly improved economic fundamentals. Therefore,
the policymaker of such a ‘competent0country will have an incentive to abandon the CBA in order
to signal this successful economic adjustment to the markets. This would diminish uncertainty in
the pre-accession period and increase the probability of being accepted into the euro-area.6
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the main arguments for and against
abandoning CBA arrangements during ERMII participation. The basic model is developed in
5 According to the convergence criteria, the long-term interest rate should not exceed the average rate of the
three best performing EU Member States in terms of inﬂation by more than two percentage points.
6 One could argue that a country could retain the CBA and signal competence through a lower budget deﬁcit.
However, signalling by the deﬁcit level is more diﬃcult. Data are less frequent and less reliable since annual deﬁcit
ﬁgures are ﬁnalized with a long time delay.
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CBA within ERM. The last section concludes.
2 Pros and cons of retaining a CBA within ERMII
According to its economic characteristics and the state of reforms, candidate countries are following
a variety of exchange rate regimes from relatively free ﬂoats to currency board arrangements.
Speciﬁcally, CBAs exist in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania while Latvia also has a currency-
board-like system. A currency board arrangement is a ﬁxed exchange rate arrangement in which
the monetary base is backed by foreign reserves and the coverage ratio is very high. This implies
automatic convertibility and the prohibition of domestic credit creation by the central bank:
money supply and inﬂation become endogenous.
Several arguments have been proposed for retaining a CBA during the ERMII participation
period. Firstly, abandoning a CBA for an exchange rate mechanism with relatively wide ﬂuc-
tuation bands such as ERMII implies moving to a more discretionary environment in which the
credibility of monetary policy might be seriously tested. Bringing down inﬂation has been the
main target of countries establishing a CBA. Ghosh et al. (2000) argue that the majority of mod-
ern currency boards has been remarkably successful in achieving lower inﬂation and price stability.
This implies that credible CBAs reduced the inﬂationary bias related to the time inconsistency
problem of monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983).78
Secondly, an obvious advantage of retaining a CBA is saving the cost of introducing institutions
and policy instruments that will only be used during ERMII participation (e.g. inﬂation targeting)
as suggested by Begg et al. (2001). Although there are no exact estimates of this cost, it is diﬃcult
to argue that operating without a CBA within ERMII will be a costless switch for transition
7 De Haan et al. (2001) examine whether the same result could have been achieved by granting independence
to the Central Bank.
8 Although discussing the beneﬁts and costs of a CBA in a general framework is beyond the scope of this paper,
it should be noted that accession to the EU resolves an important disadvantage of modern CBAs namely the lack
of a predeﬁned exit strategy.
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Finally, retaining a CBA is also considered as a way to cope with the risk of speculative
attacks. Sinn (1999) argues that currency boards are appealing exchange rate regimes even for
potential EMU entry countries currently without CBAs. Backing their monetary base by euros
according to an exchange rate prescribed by law will protect currencies from speculative attacks
and will allow capital inﬂow at low interest rates. The risk of contagion in the presence of ﬁnancial
instability in the area creates a stronger case for retaining a CBA arrangement. However, Ghosh
et al. (2000) note that even CBAs may become subject to speculative attacks if markets believe
that policymakers will not be willing to retain the arrangement in presence of a severe asymmetric
shock. Irwin (2004) emphasizes the importance of incomplete information about the devaluation
cost and the presence of labour markets rigidities for the occurence of a currency crisis in a currency
board.
Restricting exchange rate ﬂuctuations by retaining a CBA within ERMII will, however, have
the following drawbacks: Firstly, allowing the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate within the bands of
ERMII could restrict the inﬂationary consequences of capital inﬂows in the period before joining
the euro-area. Two main forms of capital inﬂows will threaten price stability: On the one hand,
inﬂation will be aﬀected by capital inﬂows resulting from an expected convergence play due to
the coexistence of open capital markets, ﬁxed exchange rates and still declining interest rates in
that period. These inﬂows will increase money supply, decrease interest rates, increase inﬂation
and will have a negative impact on competitiveness. In that context, wage and price ﬂexibility
as well as further ﬁscal tightening are important for coping with the inﬂationary consequences
of capital inﬂows (Begg et al., 2001). However, in some cases exchange rate ﬂuctuation within
the ERMII bands may be a more appropriate response.9 On the other hand, capital inﬂows
may correspond to longer term investment. To the extent that foreign direct investment leads
9 For example, the Bank of Greece responded to capital inﬂows by allowing the Greek drachma to remain above
its central rate by up to 9%. This created expectations for a devaluation before the euro-area participation with a
negative impact on capital inﬂows (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2001). Moreover, ﬁscal tightening may restrict public
investment in economies with a need for building a public capital stock.
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of the catch-up process of the transition economies according to the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect.10
Begg et al. (2001) ﬁnd empirical evidence in favour of a strong Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect in
the accession countries. In fact, they argue that transition countries will experience signiﬁcant
real appreciations, possibly extending after participation in the euro-area.11 This implies that,
although in the framework of ERMII there will be a dilemma between price stability and exchange
rate stability, in the framework of a CBA the inﬂationary consequences of the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect cannot be partly oﬀset by exchange rate policy. Therefore, choosing to retain a CBA may
jeopardize the satisfaction of the price stability criterion and harm the credibility of the system.
Secondly, an argument against retaining the CBA is that in such an arrangement exchange rate
stability and the appropriateness of the central rate cannot be tested. This is important since ERM
central rates have been corrected in several occasions: For example, the Greek drachma entered
ERM after a devaluation of 12% which has been partly cancelled in a subsequent realignment.
Nevertheless, there are other ways of testing the appropriateness of the central rate apart from
exchange rate stability in a CBA (Gulde et al., 2000). The inappropriateness of the exchange rate
will prohibit interest rate convergence in an environment of free capital mobility since long term
interest rates will contain a risk premium for the lack of readiness for EMU (Begg et al., 2001).
Hence, an argument against a CBA is that the cost of re-adjusting the central rate in a CBA is
by construction higher than a realignment within ERMII.
A ﬁnal important issue is how the coexistence of a CBA and ERMII aﬀects markets’ perception
about the country’s prospect to enter the euro-area. CBAs have been introduced by countries in a
vulnerable period of their economic development. Exiting may indicate a substantial improvement
10 According to the Ballassa-Samuelson eﬀect, fast-growing countries are characterized by higher productivity
growth in the traded sector compared to the non-traded sector. If wage developments in the two sectors are similar,
inﬂation in the non-traded sector will be higher than inﬂation in the traded sector leading to real exchange rate
appreciation.
11 Capital inﬂows can reinforce the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect. Begg et al. (2001) show that foreign direct
investment raises productivity more in the traded sector than in the non-traded sector, although this bias is
reversed in the long term.
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the robustness of the economy. The period before euro-participation will be characterized by
markets’ uncertainty about the ability of the candidate country to join the euro-area. In that
respect, the government of the transition country will have an information advantage by being in
a better position to know and evaluate the magnitude of planned and realized economic reforms.
Since markets’ reaction in that ﬁnal stage may crucially aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome, i.e. satisfaction
of the convergence criteria and entrance into the euro-area, the government of the candidate
country will have an incentive either to signal the success of economic adjustment or to hide its
‘incompetence’.12 The next section shows formally how a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime
such as ERMII without a CBA may allow the candidate country to signal its ability in order to
increase the probability of its acceptance in the euro-area.
3 The decision to retain a CBA within ERMII
3.1 The model
We will use a simple Barro-Gordon type model in order to investigate the choice of the exchange
rate regime of a candidate country aiming at being accepted in the euro area. We assume that the
world lasts three periods. The pre-ERM period, the ERM period and the ﬁnal period in which the
country may enter the euro-area. In the ﬁrst period the exchange rate regime followed is a CBA.
As shown in Figure 1 the country has two options in the second period: participation in ERMII
without a CBA or entrance to ERMII while retaining the CBA. In period 3, the country will
adopt the euro with probability ϕ. For simplicity, we assume that if the country is not accepted
in the euro-zone it will suﬀer a credibility loss resulting in a free ﬂoating exchange rate regime in
the third period.13
12 For example, markets’ disappointment on the economic prospects of the candidate country may lead to higher
interest rates and threaten the satisfaction of the convergence criteria.
13 This is a helpful assumption since abandoning the CBA in the ﬁnal period is the only cost assumed from
failing to adopt the euro. The main results of the paper would still be valid by relaxing this assumption as long as
one introduces some other cost for the country that is not accepted to the euro area.
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Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes
The deviation of employment from the ‘natural level’,
is given by the following Lucas supply function:
nt = a(πt − πe
t)+ut (1)
where, π stands for inﬂation, superscript e denotes the expectations operator and subscript t
denotes the time period. We assume that u is a random variable which for simplicity equals zero
in the ﬁrst and the last period. In the second period, u is a competence shock that reﬂects the
country’s ability to implement successfully appropriate economic reforms. The level of economic
adjustment undertaken by a candidate country will aﬀect the natural rate of employment of the
country as in Persson and Tabellini (1990).14 This assumption implies that, despite the sev-
eral surveillance processes and the satisfaction of the convergence criteria, there is still a random
14 The assumption that u reﬂects the competence level of the policymaker is a similar with the one made by
Persson and Tabellini (1990). They develop a signalling model where the incumbent with a high u has an incentive
to signal his/her competence level to the voters in order to get re-elected. Katsimi (1999) presents a signalling
game in which a policymaker with electoral motives signals competence through ﬁscal policy.
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pace of economic reforms undertaken in these countries, we assume that there is some uncertainty
regarding the sustainability of improved economic performance. In other words, economic per-
formance captured by the level of employment may improve or deteriorate by u reﬂecting the
competence of the government to face emerging economic problems. This competence is random
because the nature of economic problems the policymaker faces changes randomly. Speciﬁcally, it
is assumed that u2 takes only two values: a high value, u2 = uh with probability ρ, if economic
adjustment has been successful and a low value, u2 = ul with probability 1-ρ, if the government
of the transition country has been unsuccessful in implementing the appropriate reforms, where
E(u)=ρuh +(1-ρ)ul=0.15 Information about this competence shock between the government of
the candidate country and the private sector is asymmetric in the sense that its value is known
only by the government in the current period.
Assuming purchasing power parity, a country’s inﬂation rate will be determined by the foreign
inﬂation rate, π
f
t , and the rate of depreciation of the currency, ∆et:
πt = π
f
t + ∆et (2)
The level of the domestic interest rate is determined by the level of the foreign interest rate
and the expected rate of depreciation, in line with the interest parity condition:
it = i
f
t + E(et+1 − et)( 3 )
Finally, money supply is given by the following LM equation:
mt − pt = λnt − γit (4)
A si nt h em a j o r i t yo fB a r r o - G o r d o nt y p em o d e l s ,t h eg o v e r n m e n to ft h ec a n d i d a t ec o u n t r y
15 The competence shock diﬀers from the economic shock included in most Barro-Gordon type models. It mainly
reﬂects uncertainty about the robustness of the speciﬁc economy which in turn depends on the success and the
sustainability of the country’s reforms and the improvement in economic fundamentals.
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t + b(nt − n∗
t)2]( 5 )
where b is the relative weight the policymaker (or the national central bank) attributes to
the employment target and n∗ is the government’s target level for employment. We assume that,
when deciding on economic policy the policymaker knows the value of u, while the private sector
observes the competence shock with a lag after the realization of employment.
Table 1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
- Wages are set -Wages are set -Wages are set
- Money supply, m1 is set - u2 is observed by the - u2 is observed by the private
- i1 is observed government sector
- Employment, n1 is -The decision to participate in - EU decides if the country will
determined by π1 and πe
1 ERMII and to retain the CBA be accepted in the euro-area
- π1 is observed is made - Money supply, m3 is set
-Money supply, m2 is set - i3 is observed
-i2 is observed - Employment, n3 is determined
-Employment, n2 is determined by π3 and πe
3
by π2 , πe
2 and u2 --π3 is observed
-π2 is observed
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sp r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1 .I ne a c hp e r i o d ,t h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si st y p i c a l
of a non-stochastic Barro-Gordon type model in the sense that money supply is set after wage
determination. We assume that the level of the interest rate is determined after the money supply
has determined but before observing inﬂation. In the second period, the realization of u is observed
by the policymaker before deciding on the exchange rate regime. Given wages and the exchange
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(1) in each period.
3.2 The last period
If the country adopts the euro in the last period, the price level is given by PPP:
pE
3 = eE + p
f
3 (6)
where eE is the irrevocably ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t et ot h ee u r o . 16 In this case the domestic interest
rate equals the euro-area rate. Substituting equation (6) in (1) indicates that employment will
equal its natural rate in this period, n3 =0 . Substituting for employment, interest rates and the
price level in the LM equation (4) gives the money supply in the last period.
Substituting for π3 = eE + p
f








3 − p2)2 + b(−n∗
3)2]( 7 )
If the country fails to adopt the euro, both ERMII and the CBA are being abandoned so
that the policymaker minimizes equation (5) under discretion. We ﬁrst include the interest parity
condition (3) in the LM equation (4). We then solve the LM equation for p3 :
p3 = m3 − λn3 + γi
f
3 (8)
Next, we take expectations of equation (8) and by substituting (8) and its expected value in




[m3 − E(m3)] (9)
By including the supply curve (1) in the price equation and taking expectations, the price
equation becomes:
16 For simplicity we assume eE to be exogenous.
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In line with Barro-Gordon type models, wage formation is based on rational inﬂation expecta-
tions. Thus, E(m3) is given by the FOCs resulting from minimizing (5) subject to equations (9)
and (10).











3 )2 + b(−n∗
3)2] (12)
Although comparing welfare in the two environments is beyond the scope of this paper, one










3 + p2 + abn∗
3 (13)
3.3 The second period
If in the middle period the country retains a CBA, then, by following the same steps of the







2 − p1)2 + b(ui
2 − n∗
2)2] (14)
17 De Haan et al. (2001) compare welfare between a currency board and an independent central bank.
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the other hand, if in the second period the currency of the country participates in ERMII without
aC B A ,the price equation (8) will depend on the probability of adopting the euro in the next
period, ϕ, the irrevocable exchange rate, eE, and the expected exchange rate if the country fails
to adopt the euro in the next period, eD
3 .
p2 = m2 − λn2 + γ[i
f
2 + ϕeE +( 1− ϕ)E2(eD
3 ) − E2(e2)] (15)
where E2(eD
3 ) is given by the expected value of equation (13).
By solving the PPP equation for e2, taking expectations and substituting in equation (15) for


















(1 + aλ)(1 + γϕ)
E(m2) (16)
Thus the governments expected loss function in ERMII is given by equation (5) after substi-
tuting for p2 from equation (16) and n2 from equation (1).
We assume that the government follows the following rule for the money supply, m= M +
µu. Expectations on money supply and inﬂation are derived under discretion from minimizing the
loss function with respect to m2 s u b j e c tt ot h ec o n s t r a i n tf o rt h ee x c h a n g er a t ei m p l i e db yt h e
ERMII regime:
0 ≤ E(e2) ≤ s (17)
where s is the upper band of ERMII and zero is the normalized lower bound of the exchange rate.
Then the government sets m2 so that 0 ≤ e2 ≤ s.19
18 We assume that all exchange rate regimes are credible.
19 For a more sophisticated dynamic Barro-Gordon type model incorporating a target-zone exchange rate regime
see Philippopoulos and Coles (1997).
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We obtain more than one optimal values for m2,π2 and n2 depending on whether e2 and E(e2)
lay within or at the margins of the bands deﬁned by the target-zone. Table 2 presents the resulting






2 − p1 π2 = s + p
f
2 − p1 −
abui
2




































2 > 0 e2 = −p
f









2 − p1 π2 = p
f
2 − p1 −
abui
2















Assuming that the government’s employment target is the same in each period n∗
2 = n∗
3 = n∗ ,





20 Note that the eﬀect of the expected euro conversion rate on the current rate is captured by the money supply
since the optimal level of money supply set by the government will decrese with eE. De Grauwe (1996) and De
Grauwe et al. (1999) examine the exchange rate dynamics in the period between the announcenent of euro adoption
and the conversion date.
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3.4 The ﬁrst period.
In the ﬁrst period, the exchange rate regime is a CBA. This implies that the price level is given
by:
pCBA
1 = eC + p
f
1 (21)
where eC is chosen by the government that minimizes the following loss function with respect







1 − p0)2 + b(−n∗
1)2] (22)
This implies that eCBA = p0 − p
f
1 so that pCBA
1 = p0. Employment in the ﬁrst period will not
deviate from its natural rate:
n1 = 0 (23)
Substituting for the optimal exchange rate in the LM equation, we get the money supply in
the ﬁrst period:




t + E(e2)] (24)
Table 3 summarizes the values of the main variables in the three periods.
21 In order to avoid having a negative exchange rate we assume that at the beginning of the world the price level
equals po.
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3





1+a2b eE + p
f
3 − p1 − π2 abn
∗
et p0 − p
f










nt 0 ui u
i
1+ba2 0 0
In the analysis that follows we will assume that eE is such that even a country that retains
the CBA in the second period will beneﬁtf r o ml o w e ri n ﬂation if it participates in the euro area




Proposition 1 If the possibility of retaining the CBA within ERMII does not exist, then only a
country with a high level of competence and/or a low ‘inﬂationary bias’ will beneﬁtf r o mp a r t i c i -
pating in ERMII.
Proof. Assume that a country can decide on ERMII participation in period 2. If the country
participates in ERMII, then the expected loss is given by LERM
2 + ϕLE
3 +(1−ϕ)LD
3 . If a country
remains in a CBA, then the expected loss is given by LCBA
2 +LCBA
3 . A CBA country will abandon
















2(1 + ba2 − ϕ)
2(1 + ba2)
+ ϕ(abn∗










where k=eE + p
f
3 − p1,ϑ X / ϑ u ≤ 0.
4 Signaling competence through ERMII participation
L e tu sn o wc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ea c t u a lp robability of entering to the euro-zone is not
exogenous but a negative function of the interest rate diﬀerential to the euro area in the second
period ϕ =1−f(i2 −if),ϑ ϕ / ϑ i 2 < 0. This assumption is consistent with the existing criteria for
euro-area participation speciﬁed in the Maastricht Treaty.22 A c c o r d i n gt oo u rm o d e l ,t h ep r i v a t e
sector in the second period expects that if a country fails to adopt the euro, the exchange rate will
22 Including the inﬂation diﬀerential in the convergence criteria is also possible.
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that, E2(eE−e2) <E 2(eD
3 −e2) = 0. By the interest parity condition, expectations about exchange
rate depreciation aﬀect the level of the domestic interest rate. Given that the level of the domestic
interest rate is determined before observing u, the private sector attaches an equal probability to
both types of government so that ϕ0 =1− f(i2 = if +0 .5E2(eD
3 − e2)+0 .5E2(eE
3 − e2)).
In the second period, a country within ERMII will decide to abandon the CBA if the expected








2 )+( 1− ϕ0)LD
3
Proposition 2 If the possibility of retaining the CBA within ERMII exists, then the net beneﬁt
of abandoning the CBA will increase with the level of competence of the country.





2 ) − LE
3 (pERM
2 )] < 0 (25)
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where ϑZ/ϑu ≥ 0.
Figure 2 depicts Proposition 2. Other things being equal, a country with a competence level
above u∗ will abandon the CBA during the ERM period.
Next, we want to use the model developed above to show that it may be optimal for the
policymaker of a country which participates in a currency board to abandon this arrangement
in order to signal its competence and to reap the beneﬁts of euro-area participation. If the
currency board arrangement is abandoned, then private agents employ this information in order
to draw inference concerning the government’s competence, u. Private agents’ beliefs regarding
the competence of the government aﬀect the probability of entering the euro-area through the level
of the interest rate. Therefore, inferring the competence level of the government will aﬀect the
probability of an exchange rate depreciation in the next period, thereby aﬀecting the interest rate
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Figure 2: ERM particiaption and CBA
and the probability of entering the euro-area. Let us assume that there are two types of countries:
a high-ability (‘strong’) country and a low-ability (‘weak’) country. The ‘strong’ country has an
incentive to abandon the CBA in order to make the private sector believe that it has a high level
of competence (u=uh) thereby securing entrance to the euro-area.23 Similarly, the ‘weak’ country
may have an incentive to mimic this behaviour.
Inequality (25) allows three possible cases: both types of countries retain the CBA, both types
abandon the CBA or the ‘strong’ country abandons the CBA and the ‘weak’ country retains the
arrangement.24 We will ﬁrst assume that the competence level of both types is such that both
choose to retain the CBA: Inequality (25) does not hold for any type.
There is a multiplicity of sequential equilibrium, including both a separating and a pooling
equilibrium. We restrict our attention to equilibria in pure strategies. In the separating equilib-
23 We assume that inﬂation is the only policy instrument available to the government. One could argue, however,
that the government could retain the CBA and use ﬁscal deﬁcit as a signal. We think that deﬁcit is a less appropriate
instrument for signalling since reliable deﬁcit ﬁgures are available only with considerable time lags.
24 Since uh >u l it is not possible that LCBA
2 <L ERM
2 for the h-type and not for the l-type.
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private sector. This implies that the ‘strong’ country convinces the private sector of its true type,
in which case we assume that ϕh =1− f(i2 = if)=1 . On the other hand, for simplicity we
assume that ϕl =1− f(i2 = if + E2(eD
3 − e2)) = 0.
If ρ is the probability that the country is ‘strong’, private sectors’ beliefs can be described by
ρ=1 if the country abandons the CBA in the second period and and ρ=0 if the CBA is retained.
In this equilibrium, the ‘strong’ country signals its identity by abandoning the CBA and the ‘weak’
country does not attempt to mimic. This implies that the low-ability country retains the CBA.





2 ) − LD
3 (26)





2 ) − LD
3 (27)
for the country with low u.T h e ﬁrst inequality implies that for the ‘strong’ country the
expected gain from signaling exceeds the cost whereas the second inequality states that for the
‘weak’ country the cost of mimicking exceeds the expected beneﬁt.







for the ‘strong’ country and S<0 for the ‘weak’ country.








3 − k)] ≥ 0
Figure 3 depicts the separating equilibrium. If the choice of the exchange rate regime in
the second period cannot aﬀect private sector’s beliefs about the country’s competence level, both
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Figure 3: Separating equilibrium
types will retain the CBA within ERMII since Z(uh)<0a n dZ ( u l)<0. Under signaling, the ‘strong’
country will have an incentive to abandon the CBA as long as its competence is higher than us.
The ‘weak’ country will not have an incentive to mimic the exchange rate strategy of the ‘strong’
one as long as its competence is below us.
The country’s competence level u has two eﬀects on the beneﬁt of abandoning the CBA in the
second period: On the one hand a high u implies a lower inﬂationary bias in ERMII from equation
(20) so that ϑ(LERM
2 − LCBA
2 )/ϑu < 0, (domestic credibility eﬀect) and on the other hand, it
also decreases the beneﬁt of participating in the euro area in terms of lower inﬂation. The latter
eﬀect occurs since prices in ERMII are lower for the h-type, pERM
2 (ul) >pERM
2 (uh)s ot h a tf o ra
given price level in the euro-area, pE
3 , inﬂation within the euro area will be higher for the ‘strong’
country (borrowed credibility eﬀect). Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the ﬁrst eﬀect is stronger
than the latter so that Z and S have a positive slope. By comparing Z with S we can see that S
crosses the vertical axis at a higher point and that the slope of S is lower than the slope of Z. The
lower slope of Z results from a stronger borrowed credibility eﬀect in the case of signaling since
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levels of u compatible with our reasonable restrictions so that the possibility of signaling implies
a change in the optimal exchange rate strategy for country’s with competence us<u<u∗.
Note that eliminating weakly dominated strategies does not eliminate a pooling equilibrium in
which both types of countries choose to abandon the CBA. In this case, as shown in the Appendix
the ‘strong’ country abandons the CBA and so does the ‘weak’ one. However, by using the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) we can rule out pooling equilibria.
In our analysis we assumed that ERMII participation is a unilateral decision of the candidate
country, thereby ignoring the euro-area’s incentives to accept a currency in ERMII. Modeling
ERMII participation as a bilateral decision could allow us to investigate some further signaling
channel of abandoning the CBA since by accepting a candidate country in ERMII the euro-area
oﬀers a positive signal for the expected macroeconomic performance of the speciﬁcc o u n t r y .T h i s
is the case because ERMII participation implies some cost-sharing: If a currency is attacked by
speculators, the ECB must intervene at the margins in order to defend the currency unless price
stability is threatened. Moreover, markets’ conﬁdence in the common currency may be aﬀected.
This signal is stronger the more costly it is for the Eurosystem to accept in ERMII a currency of
ac o u n t r yw i t hi n s u ﬃcient convergence. Clearly, the ECB will be reluctant to accept a currency
in ERMII if the cost is signiﬁcant. In that respect, ERMII participation is an indication of high
‘competency’. If a CBA is retained, it will be less costly for the ECB to accept the currency in
the ERM and therefore the positive signal to the markets will be weaker. This signaling beneﬁto f
ERMII participation is more important for an emerging country for which market’s information
is limited or less credible.
5 Other sources of uncertainty
In our analysis we assumed that the decision to participate in ERMII depends on various observable
f a c t o r ss u c ha se m p l o y m e n ta n di n ﬂation and one unobservable factor, the level of competence.
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unobservable variable and there is no signal extraction problem. However, if this decision will
depends on more than one unobservable factors the public may not be able to infer with certainty
whether the exchange rate regime decision of the government is due to high competence or due
to other unobservable factors.25 CBAs have been generally introduced by countries in crisis. For
example establishing a CBA has often been proposed as a solution to the time inconsistency
problem of monetary policy in high-inﬂation countries. What guarantee do markets have that
abandoning the CBA will not bring back old problems and reduce the chances of entering the
euro-area because inﬂation becomes too high. One possible source for having a high level of
inﬂation in the pre-CBA period could be the combination of a discretionary environment with a
relatively low preference of the monetary authorities for price stability. In our model this preference
is captured by the relative weight the monetary authority attaches to the employment target in
equation (5), b. Equation (18) implies that in a discretionary environment the inﬂationary bias
will increase with b which reﬂects the relative weight the policymaker attributes to reducing the
gap between current employment and the target level of employment, ϑπERM
2 /ϑb ≥ 0. Therefore,
it would be legitimate to assume that before establishing the CBA the monetary authority of
the accession countries had a high level of b whereas the public does not know if, as a result of
important economic reforms, this structural parameter has been decreased or not. In particular
we will assume that the government’s preference for low inﬂation reﬂected by the level of b cannot
be observed by the private sector in period 2. In line with Vickers (1986), we further assume that
b can only take two values a low and a high value, 0<bl <b h <∞ and that b is uncorrelated
with the competence shock, u whereas we call the policymakers with a high (low) level of b as
‘wets’(‘drys’).26
25 This signal extraction problem is investigated by the literature on limit pricing under uncertainty. See Math-
h e w sa n dM i r m a n( 1 9 8 3 ) .
26 Other models that assume uncertainty about the weights attached to inﬂation and unemployment in the
policymaker’s objective function are Vickers (1986) and Persson and Tabellini (1990).
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extend the inﬂation level and the exchange rate regime choice depend on the value of b or on the
value of the competence shock u. For example it is possible that πERM
2 (uh,b h)=πERM
2 (ul,b l).
We already know from Proposition 1 that if the possibility of retaining the CBA within ERMII
does not exist, then the net beneﬁt from participating in ERMII decreases with the level of b.
In this framework the separating equilibrium deﬁned in the previous section exists if the net gain
from signalling deﬁned by inequality (26) is positive for the ‘strong’ country whereas the net gain
from mimicking deﬁned by inequality (27) is negative for the ‘weak’ country for any level of b,
S(uh,b i)≥ 0), S(ul,b i)< 0), i = h,l.
Introducing uncertainty about the poilicymaker’s inﬂation aversion has two important impli-
cation for the separating equilibrium: Firstly, the gain from signalling depends positively on b
because the beneﬁt from joining the euro area in terms of lower inﬂation will be higher for the
country with the higher inﬂationary bias. This implies that a ‘strong’ country will have a stronger
incentive to signal its identity and a ‘weak’ country will have a stronger incentive to mimic if the
policymaker is ‘wet’. Secondly, the cost of signalling also depends positively on b because the
higher the inﬂationary bias, the higher the loss from abandoning a CBA for a more discretionary
environment. Compare to the ﬁrst eﬀect this second eﬀect works in the opposite direction since
it implies that a ‘strong’ country will have a stronger incentive to signal its identity and a ‘weak’
country will have a stronger incentive to mimic if the policymaker is ‘dry’. Given that the ﬁrst
eﬀect does not depend on the level of competence whereas the second eﬀect becomes stronger as
u increases, we can show that, if the competence diﬀerential of the two types is not very small,
the ﬁrst (second) eﬀect will be dominant for the ‘weak’ (‘strong’) country. This implies that
S(uh,b l)≥S(uh,b h)≥S(ul,b h)≥S(ul,b l) so that a separating equilibrium exists where the strong
country will abandon the CBA for every policymaker type, S(uh,b i)≥ 0 , while the weak country
will retain the CBA, S(ul,b l)≤S(ul,b h) < 0.27
27 Another source of uncertainty could be the presence of an economic disturbance from the supply side, v.
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As suggested by recent literature on the accession countries, participation in ERMII may not
imply a smooth transition to the euro-area for countries which currently follow ﬁxed exchange
rate regimes such as a CBA. Relaxing the exchange rate regime by abandoning the CBA entails
the cost of a temporary institutional change and the inﬂationary cost of moving to a more discre-
tionary environment. Moreover, the new environment could make the economies more vulnerable
to speculative attacks due to weak fundamentals or contagion eﬀects. On the other hand, the
relatively wide ﬂuctuation bands of ERMII may allow restricting the inﬂationary consequences
of short-term capital ﬂows due to an expected convergence play as well as due to the existence
of a strong Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect and it will also allow testing the appropriateness of the cen-
tral rate. Without undermining the important advantages of retaining a CBA within ERMII,
the paper emphasized another aspect of that choice namely its eﬀect on markets’ expectations.
Participation in ERMII without a CBA may allow the candidate country to signal its ability
for sustainable nominal convergence to the markets, thereby increasing the probability of future
participation to the euro-area.
If accession countries are given the option to retain a CBA until euro area participation, this
choice should be based on an evaluation of all arguments mentioned above by the countries con-
cerned. If economic reforms have altered signiﬁcantly the conditions that led to the establishment
of a CBA, then the cost of abandononing the arrangement (e.g. higher inﬂation) may not be
signiﬁcant. In such an environment the decision to join ERM without a CBA can have a posi-
tive impact on markets’ expectations. If, however, there is a risk that abandoning the CBA will
bring back the problems responsible for its establishment in the ﬁrst place, then retaining the
arrangement is clearly optimal. Future research in this area may also emphasize further aspects of
asymmetric information. Allowing the ERMII participating country to retain its CBA may also
imply moral hazard issues if information about economic performance between the country and
However, even in this case one can show that a separating equilibrium will exist if S(uh,vl)≥S(ul,vl).
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the fear of speculative attacks due to poor fundamentals so that countries may apply for ERMII
participation even if their economic fundamentals are not adequately solid yet.
Appendix
In the pooling equilibrium the private sector can learn nothing about the competence of the
country from the exchange rate regime choice so that p=1/2 if the CBA is retained (and, thus,
ϕ = ϕ0). A pooling equilibrium requires that for the ‘weak’ type the cost of mimicking is smaller








Figure 4 depicts the pooling equilibrium. If we reformulate inequality (27) as P>0, it is
straightforward to show that Z-P<0a n dt h a tϑZ/ϑu = ϑP/ϑu. This implies that although in
the absence of signaling an l-type country with a competence level below u0 will not abandon the
CBA, Z<0, the incentive to mimic the h-type will induce the country to abandon the CBA since
P>0
However, by using the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) we can rule out pooling
equilibria. The equilibrium exchange rate strategy of both types abandoning the CBA in the
second period is unintuitive if the ‘strong’ country would prefer to abandon the CBA if it could
convince the markets of its true type whereas the ‘weak’ country would prefer to retain the CBA
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Figure 4: Pooling Equilibrium
for the ‘weak’ country.
We can write the two conditions as C>0f o rt h eh - t y p ea n dC <0f o rt h el - t y p e . U n d e rt h e
reasonable assumption that ϕ0 is close to 0.5, one can show that C-P<0. This implies that the
pooling equilibrium is unintuitive for all u<u”(Figure 4).
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